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Contextual Evolution 
of Hybrid Warfare and the 
Complexities 
Rakesh Sharma 
The French historian Marc Bloch, post German blitzkrieg in 1940, 
remarked that “…our leaders . . . were incapable of thinking in terms of 
new war. . . [Their] minds were too inelastic.”
Prelude
On September 14, 2019, at 4.00 am, Saudi Arabia suffered a deadly attack 
on its Aramco owned oil facility at Abqaiq and Khurais oil field, with, as 
has been stated in a version, a swarm of 18 small drones and seven cruise 
missiles. Very highly protected and fortified facilities, in addition to armed 
guards, the area had six battalions of Patriot defence systems, Oerlikon GDF 
35mm cannons equipped with the Skyguard radar and Surface-to-Air-
Missiles (SAMs). The targets were designated with pin-point accuracy and, 
hence, the strikes were most effective. They destroyed nearly 50 per cent 
of the country’s global supply of crude. The crude prices rose sharply in 
the international market that saw the US Secretary of State proclaiming 
it was an “act of war”– yet without a declaration of war. By exactitude, 
the perpetrators were unidentified, even the trajectory of the flights of 
the missiles and drones could not be ascertained; only remnants of the 
Lieutenant General (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd) is currently Distinguished Fellow at CLAWS. 
2  CLAWS Journal l Winter 2019
Yemeni Quds 1 missile were displayed. The conjectures are aplenty – from 
drone swarms, to cruise missiles, to stealth aircraft and even ground action! 
It is also a fallout of the usage of the modern war weaponry: plausible 
deniability! This is a manifestation of the 21st century’s hybrid warfare. 
War is a historic constant. In strategic history, ‘war’ has had many 
definitions and recurring generational divides. Nations invest billions of 
dollars in preparing their militaries for the next war. Futurologists, bright 
thinkers and strategists had, in history, forecast and laid down strategies 
and planned conduct of wars that did not succeed eventually. Warfare 
is an exceedingly complex venture, where information is scanty, unclear 
and outdated;1 as the edifice of military planning is built on assumptions, 
these almost often go wrong. With dwindling defence budgets, and the 
veritable sprint in military technologies, the armed forces are placed in a 
dilemmatic situation on enunciating futuristic military doctrine strategy, 
and creating a future force. The easiest way out for militaries is to bask in 
the status quo, and, hence, it is often stated that Generals have a tendency 
to “fight the last war”.2
Historically, the Clausewitzian relationship of politics and warfare has 
stood. Once a war was imminent or ensued, the political aims articulated 
were then translated into a military strategy for victory in war. Traditional 
percepts of warfare have remained inter-state, where victory implies 
capture of large tracts of territory (even in a desolate countryside), taking 
a large number of prisoners of war, or decimation of the adversary’s war-
waging potential, as these are the considered finality in the capitulation of 
the enemy and dictating the victor’s political will. 
This article aims to deal with the conceptual underpinnings of hybrid 
warfare, its complex character, and attempts to sift through the maze of 
its multi-faceted domains. It would highlight the emanating concoction 
in warfare, in which many forms of belligerence are usable, disaggregated 
or aggregated or in tandem, as per the political aims and military end 
state sought.
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Transition in the Character of Warfare
The character of war has changed, and is steadily changing. The role of 
non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, 
and, in many cases, these have exceeded the power of force of weapons 
and their effectiveness. This implies that wars in the future may remain 
unannounced, in non-kinetic format, and may even be successful in 
achieving political goals without transcending to force-on-force wars. 
Certainly, use of kinetic means in standoff forms such as precision guided 
munitions, missiles and rockets or space warfare, can supplement to 
achieve the political aims in a short timeframe. Indeed, “…the categories 
of warfare are blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy boxes.”3
Researchers and analysts worldwide are proclaiming that future 
warfare will be different. In the last 20 years, the pace of change has 
accelerated, due in no small part to the advent of new technologies 
that are transforming the way wars are fought, as well as the operating 
environment in which they take place. The pace of change in the 
information warfare domain and space, and technologies like drone 
swarms, directed energy weapons, artificial intelligence, high-powered 
microwave, autonomous systems and robotics, to name but a few, is so 
rapid that doctrinal and strategic changes are unable to keep pace. The 
ambit of information warfare and artificial intelligence is ever expanding, 
with digital storage, computation, and transmission of data bits combined 
with miniaturisation of land, air, surface, and sub-surface platforms of 
ever-increasing mobility and endurance. 
Computers and the internet, in particular, have played a key role in 
shaping the transitory nature of warfare. Two emerging technologies 
relative to the fresh non-kinetic domains—cyber and autonomous 
systems—dictate contemplation. Non-kinetic means act as force multipliers 
to target the will of the adversary through shaping the environment, and 
lowering the enemy’s will through coercion and hedging, leading to 
softening through exploitation of existing faultlines. There is movement 
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towards future wars with extreme lethality. Loitering munitions, also 
known as Lethal Miniature Aerial Munitions (LMAMs), are a form of 
an unmanned aircraft system that incorporates a warhead and can be 
thought of functionally as an unmanned kamikaze plane. Given their 
plane-like attributes, LMAMs are able to stay aloft for extended periods, 
thus, “loitering” over a target area.4
Similarly, there would be concerns of fully autonomous systems having 
the authority to take a life or start a war as an agent of state policy. The 
possibility of life-or-death decisions some day being taken by machines 
not under the direct control of humans needs to be taken seriously.5 
The increased importance of precision guided munitions, space warfare, 
stealth fighters, strategic missiles and rockets are all indications of much 
increased lethality in warfare. China’s new microwave weapon can disable 
missiles and paralyse tanks by shutting down electronic systems, even 
those with traditional shielding against Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) 
by bombarding the target with energy pulses. This amount of directed 
energy interferes with, and overloads, electronic circuits, causing them to 
shut down. China has also tested a completely new weapon, a boost glide 
hypersonic weapon system, capable of blistering speeds. With the sprint 
of military technology and cybernetics, the offensiveness of the standoff 
attacks in the future is in the realm of threats rather than imagination. 
The writing for transition in the character of warfare has been on the 
wall for some time. The narrative is that “[t]he roughly three-hundred-
year period in which war was associated primarily with the type of political 
organisation known as the state… seems to be coming to an end. If the 
last fifty years or so provide any guide, future wars will be overwhelmingly 
of the type known, however inaccurately, as ‘low intensity’”.6 The intense 
focus on counter-insurgency or low intensity warfare also tends to relegate 
the likelihood of conventional operations to clichés – short, limited, 
localised, intense, and the like. In this transition of warfare, a significant 
mention is of guerrilla warfare, terrorism and insurgency. Guerrilla warfare 
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is not a recent innovation, though, in the 1960s, it was seen as a new form 
of war that could take place despite the nuclear stalemate. Later, terrorism 
became the new metaphor for warfare. Terrorism dealt with politics and 
particularly with the way politics is conducted. Illegitimate violence, akin 
to criminal activity, is undertaken against both political and civilian targets 
as a measure to manipulate political processes.
Evolving Hybridism and Complexities in Future Warfare 
The term hybrid warfare refers to a non-linear conflict, where state actors, 
in addition to kinetic or military forces, employ non-kinetic means like 
cyber attacks, politico-economic subversion, psychological warfare, and 
diplomatic pressure to bring an adversary to heel. The hybrid nature of 
warfare has existed historically except may be in the cyber or information 
warfare realm. The breadth of hybrid warfare is limited only by the 
imagination of the employer. The concept, when postulated, referred to 
a “tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and 
criminal behaviour”7 and soon got redefined to include the “full range of 
military intelligence capabilities, non-conventional weapons, armaments, 
support units, and combat equipment, available for instant employment…
of regular forces or irregular insurgents, terrorists, or other non-state 
actors…”8 Sometimes, the term ‘fourth generation warfare’, initially 
introduced by William S. Lind, is used interchangeably with hybrid 
warfare due to the erratic nature of the threats and their interplay in the 
attainment of strategic objectives. Fourth generation warfare, however, 
is distinguished from hybrid warfare by the involvement of non-state 
actors pitted against a traditional Army. They present a decentralised, 
non-hierarchical, and non-traditional structure of threat. Contrarily — in 
hybrid warfare — wars are fought between states using non-linear tactics 
involving all elements of national power.
It is apparent, hence, that kinetic or non-kinetic (the latter will 
include cyber, social media operations, disruption of critical network 
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infrastructure, dissension, subversion, criminal activities, currency 
manipulation, environmental warfare, and the like), can be aggregated 
or disaggregated, as need be! In the study of warfare of the last decade, 
major shifts in war-fighting had been evident worldwide. Russia used only 
cyber attacks to compel Estonia in 2007, military force and cyber warfare 
in Georgia in 2008, and ‘Little Green Men’, ‘Night Wolves Motorcycle 
Club’ and cyber attacks in Crimea in 2014. Obviously, to achieve political 
aims, the protagonists utilised means other than conventional ones, 
and succeeded. The second Lebanon War in 2006 was a classic case of 
a military engagement between Israel and Hezbollah – the latter as a 
non-state actor used ‘hit and hide’ tactics. The Middle East imbroglio 
– Iraq, Syria and Yemen—comprises examples of the admixture of the 
conventional and unconventional. The most defining characteristics of 
the Syrian War are its complexities and intricacies, with multiple states 
and non-state actors pitted against each other – together or separated!
The 21st century warfare, hence, is metamorphosing without a 
distinct pattern, wherein the conventional, with increasing utilisation of 
Special Forces, irregular and terrorist forces, are not dissimilar, or with 
fundamentally different approaches. There is an increasing blurring of 
distinctions between war and peace, between the different domains of 
conflict (land, maritime, air, space, cyber) and between kinetic and non-
kinetic effect. Cyber contributes to the blurring of the distinction between 
peace and war by creating uncertainty as to what constitutes conflict in 
cyber space. They are means employed in combination by the adversary 
and conducted by both state and non-state actors. Therefore, hybridity 
in warfare has evolved as a combination of more than two elements of 
power or components of the widely spread spectrum of conflict – both 
kinetic and non-kinetic. Kinetic in this consideration would imply 
a spectrum: space weapons, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 
Nuclear (CBRN) defence, land, air, naval forces, as also insurgents and 
terrorists. Non-kinetic would encompass diplomacy, political activities, 
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Information Warfare (IW) including social media, cyber disruption of 
critical infrastructure, subversion, criminal and economic activities and 
similar conflictual activities. This evolved hybrid warfare can, hence, be 
examined as a combination of both kinetic and non-kinetic tools, used 
disaggregated or aggregated, as and when need be! 
Sifting Through the Maze of ‘Hybridity’
The term ‘hybrid warfare’ has surely caused an immense amount of 
confusion, as it has encompassed activities that were non-military and 
hithertofore not classified as warfare. This has blurred the distinction 
between the state of war and peaceful competition – like the ‘trade war’ 
between China and the USA. Such generalisations and broad-brush will 
in future lead to pessimistic and gloomy inter-state relations, and enhance 
the dimensions of national security to unimaginable proportions. Many 
of the hybrid ‘threats’ may just be risks and, even if they germinate 
well, may not tantamount to ‘war’. In a manner of speaking, the 
instruments of belligerence by an adversary in a nation like ours will be 
a multitude. Organisations tailored for space wars, cyber offensives, long 
range precision guided missiles, could well take the initiative and even 
terminate wars, without as much as involving the military in the gamut 
of conventional warfare. Indeed, disinformation campaigns under the 
overall ambit of information warfare, and, hence, under hybrid warfare 
are bound to cause grave understanding issues on the subject. It obviously 
implies that contextually, the response to the myriad threats will not be 
the military itself. The quagmire created by the hybrid nature of threats 
will place any political or national security decision-making establishment 
in a predicament to formally enunciate strategy. Therefore, the ambit of 
national security will encompass the bouquet of hybrid threats. 
It must, however, be acknowledged that non-kinetic measures by 
themselves cannot provide assurance of victory or success in achieving 
political objectives. There are also comprehension issues, on whether 
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non-kinetic attacks like cyber can be taken as declarations of war. It is 
well understood that non-kinetic means can be as devastating as kinetic 
ones and that they also have the advantage of plausible deniability by 
adversaries. A severe non-kinetic attack, though ‘denied’, will place the 
recipient nation in a quandary on what will constitute a proportionate 
response. Again, would a full-scale or limited conventional war be 
acceptable as a response to a major cyber attack?
As is apparent, the character, and, may be, even the nature, of warfare 
has changed, and the belligerents would use a new ‘mix and match’ of 
their capabilities to achieve a decisive victory. It actually implies that there 
would be no distinction between conventional and unconventional means 
to be used against the opponent, that is, in the hybrid context, attacks 
and responses can emanate from any military or even non-military sphere. 
For example, a cyber attack on civilian infrastructure like against the 
banking system, may be a kinetic full force response. This formulation of 
hybrid warfare would challenge the traditional concepts of conventional 
war. The standoff nature of the current day targeting by cyber means, 
utilising drones and cruise missiles, or even space-based assets, would 
blur the lines between the military and civilian domains. Such warfare is a 
game-changer. Any conventional superiority is of little value if the nation 
is woefully vulnerable to a catastrophic cyber attack. The threat of cruise 
missiles or drones is fine, but the fact is that a takedown of the energy grid 
or transportation network or health service is a far greater risk. This risk 
does not require any future development in cybernetics—the technology 
is available today, even in the open domain.
The broader ambit of hybrid warfare which includes the realms of 
information warfare – propaganda, psychological manipulation, media 
misdirection, subversion of the population—requires fresh thought. 
Most such typology of warfare – if it is so called – may not be practically 
attributable directly to an adversarial nation, or even a proxy. There 
would be obfuscation of state sponsorship –like the purported actions of 
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Cambridge Analytica in the build-up to the US elections in 2016, which 
included serious accusations about Russia. 
Hybrid Warfare and Strategising for India
A question that begs an answer here is whether or not a hybrid war can 
be fought with our present national security structures? What is the 
inter-relationship between hybrid warfare and military strategy? In such 
context, how does a nation like India deter hybrid threats and formulate 
its national and military strategies?
Conventional Indian concepts of war are incompatible 
and fundamentally skewed from the realities of hybrid conflict in the 21st 
century. Indian adversaries have either mastered irregular warfare or have 
sufficiently advanced technologically to embrace hybrid warfare. A linear 
conventional conflict will be a near sequential progression of a planned 
strategy, whereas a hybrid non-linear conflict will comprise simultaneous 
deployment of multiple, complementary military and non-military warfare 
tactics. In a hybrid war, the adversarial conventional military force will be 
supported by irregular, cyber and informational warfare tactics, aggregated 
together or used in disaggregated form. It must, hence, be expected that in 
future, the conflicts that India will have to face will necessarily be hybrid non-
linear wars that will be fought with the adversary employing conventional 
and irregular military forces in conjunction with psychological, economic, 
political, and cyber assaults. Confusion and disorder may ensue when 
weaponised information in India would worsen the perception of insecurity 
in the populace as political, social, and cultural identities will be attempted 
to be pitted against one another.
India must then develop a framework of strategic deterrence 
of weaponised information, finance, and other subversive forms of 
aggression against the adversaries. A ‘one size fits all’ national security 
policy would not be effective. The future nature of warfare leads us to 
the conclusion that multi-domain warfare (one that spans two or more 
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military domains—land, maritime, air, cyber, space, etc) to create new 
and innovative ways against adversaries, is the one to be strategised for.  
A joint multi-domain specialisation would indicate the right 
preparation for warfare – kinetic or non-kinetic. That is the responsibility 
on the shoulders of today’s political and military leaders. Three key 
postulations are preferred:
  Hybrid warfare, as per definition and ambit, describes domains that 
can well be termed as non-military. Hence, the prosecution of non-
military domain aggressive actions, that cause damage or destruction 
to national infrastructure, must be taken as war – even if the adversary 
is unidentifiable, unprovable or resorts to plausible deniability. Cases 
in point would be a cyber attack on the power grid, the banking 
system, and the like. As stated above, the September 2019 drone 
attacks on the Saudi Arabian oil fields have been called ‘acts of war’ 
by the US Secretary of State. War, hence, in a hybrid context may 
be a permanence state – blurring the distinction between war and 
peace. This might seem unduly alarmist, and may affect rationality in 
behaviour. However, the hybrid character of war has its dictates, and 
strategising for the same is imperative.
  Since hybrid warfare is not an isolated military domain, law 
enforcement capabilities – in India symbolised by the National Security 
Guard (NSG), National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), 
National Cyber Coordinator and agencies and Central Armed Police 
Forces (CAPFs)—require parallel developments, which are skillfully 
fused with the military domain. The challenge is to plan development 
of offensive and defensive hybrid warfare technologies and expertise in 
an era of budgetary constraints. Hybrid warfare necessitates intensive 
consolidation of all resources and security assets available with various 
agencies, without resorting to any battle of the turf.
  It is obvious that in a scenario where non-state actors take credit, 
or where the initiator of an attack cannot be determined, deterring 
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hybrid threats may not be realistic. Military conventional deterrence 
remains fixated on all-out or limited high end conventional war that 
remains within the ambit of state versus state warfare. In the case of 
India, conventional military superiority, with the threat of deterrence 
by punishment, is insufficient to force the adversary to cease the 
proxy war. This credence requires a serious rethink. The likelihood of 
a strong conventional kinetic response to a hybrid, non-kinetic attack 
must not be negated. Even the converse can be construed as feasible. 
The quid pro quo response to any form of hybrid attack may emanate 
in a totally different realm. For example a conventional air strike at 
Balakot to a terrorist strike at Pulwama! This issue created by the 
hybridisation of threats opens new vistas in the deterrence debate and 
response options, and mandates further analysis. Suffice it to say that 
a strong conventional force will be an inadequate deterrent against 
hybrid threats. Hence, a proportional or disproportionate response 
cannot be predictable and will be contingent on the national will 
and political intent at that juncture. For this, India will require an 
effective bouquet of hybrid options, a quiver full of variable arrows 
that can be selectively employed as per the political decision.
  Psychological warfare, fake news campaigns, propaganda, subversion, 
intimidation, demoralisation and the like, are commonplace. State 
and non-state actors are weaponising information, to the detriment of 
adversaries. These will become permanent features among belligerent 
states. A case in point is Cambridge Analytica, and the influence 
pedalling in the last US Presidential elections. Naturally, these are 
also hybrid threats, ones that seem perfectly benign, but which have 
immense potential to address the collective psyche of the people of a 
nation. It is not that psychological warfare is a new realm, however 
the media (including social media) for reaching out have multiplied 
manifold, their techniques are being made sophisticated, and the 
effect they are having on the populace is credible. Also, a connotation 
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of the hybrid threat, psychological warfare, is leading to increasing 
radicalisation and needs to be addressed pronto by parallel streams 
of well planned counter-radicalisation and information management.
  The definitional and terminological structure of hybrid warfare may 
have confused warfare itself. Each and every inimical act and risk 
is being branded as a hybrid threat or hybrid warfare. Any rational 
consideration of this plethora of hybrid threats, and planning 
for combating them is well nigh impossible. There is apparent 
generalisation of hybrid threats, with many of them being faceless, 
which will require a kind of toolbox that will be unimaginable in 
content. The cost-benefit analysis for catering for the hybridity will 
deter serious planning processes. Stepping back from this over-hyped 
debate that generalises hybrid warfare, and providing a deliberate and 
sifted out focus is essential. 
Conclusion
In sum, in the last 20 years, the pace of change has accelerated, due, in 
no small part, to the advent of new technologies that are transforming 
the way conventional and unconventional conflicts are fought, as well as 
the operating environment in which they take place. The national security 
strategy in the context of the myriad threats, taken as hybrid, derives 
itself from a political formulation of national aim, vision and interests. 
Contextually, military strategy, as a sub-set,envisages employment of all of 
a nation’s military capabilities at the highest of levels, including long-term 
planning, development and procurement to assure victory or success. 
The domain of military strategy in the future needs to be taken 
as a systemic approach, without anchoring future war-fighting in a 
single thematic concept of force-on-force as the common and the 
only denominator. In effect, conventional operations of the force-
on-force variety become part and parcel of the larger bouquet of 
options that amalgamate into multi-domain warfare.  Domains may 
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work in concert simultaneously to achieve goals, instead of only 
operating in, or between, two domains. Multi-domain means creating 
an effect in one domain that produces an effect in the other. Multi-
domain-specific capabilities can be leveraged to defeat a capable 
foe in another domain, or the ‘force-on-force’ operations could 
supplement the creative ways. The armed forces are at a crossroads. 
Reliance on attrition, firepower and mechanised warfare had led 
to past successes, but this alone cannot win tomorrow’s wars. The 
adversaries are analysing and testing capabilities in multi-domains, and 
would adopt and adapt their doctrines, strategies and capabilities to 
benefit from our vulnerabilities. Evolution of multi-domain warfare, 
from the concept to functional doctrines for each of the domains, 
and then an overarching grand strategy, requires understanding and 
creativity based upon emerging technologies. To arrive at the future, 
prepared and ready to dominate the fight, we need a concept to guide 
convergence and integration of capabilities across air, land, sea, space, 
cyber, and electro-magnetic spectrum.
India is a nation that has unsettled borders, and is also incessantly 
deployed in countering infiltration and terrorism. Our adversaries 
are continually upgrading to acquire hybrid capabilities that will offset 
any conventional war disadvantages that they may visualise. Hence, for 
combating the hybrid nature of warfare, India will need multi-domain 
strategies. The ‘battlespace’ will need decluttering by designating with 
rigour what inimical activities are ‘war-like’, in that they are tantamount 
to the use of force, and which ones amount to unregulated (and possibly 
unlawful) competition.
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